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Abstract 
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is 
unsatisfactory, since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is 
incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue 
that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in 
neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. 
One outcome of this is that apparent cases of downward causation can be analyzed away. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of “levels” appears in several contexts in philosophy of science. For example, the 
debates on downward causation, mechanistic explanation, reduction, and emergence are 
conducted in the framework of levels. However, there is no agreement on the definition of a 
level, or on the criteria for distinguishing levels. 
Carl Craver and Bill Bechtel have recently presented a theory of “levels of mechanisms” 
(Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008; Craver and Bechtel 2007), which has gained broad acceptance 
and is currently the most promising account of levels in philosophy of science. In levels of 
mechanisms, the relata are mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower levels. 
Importantly, these are not general levels of organization, but identified with regard to a certain 
mechanism. Craver and Bechtel claim that although levels of mechanisms is certainly not the 
only sense in which “level” is employed in neuroscience or philosophy, it captures the central 
sense in which explanations in neuroscience span multiple levels. They also apply this theory 
of levels to the problem of downward causation, arguing that what appears as downward 
causation can be explained away as same-level causation that has mechanistically mediated 
effects.  
In this paper, I will show that the mechanistic account of levels is unsatisfactory (Section 3), 
defend an alternative “deflationary” account of levels where the notion of level is replaced 
with the more fundamental notions of composition and scale (Section 4), and explore the 
consequences this has for the debate on downward causation (Section 5).  My focus is on 
neuroscience and downward causation, but the general arguments I raise against levels apply 
more broadly. First of all, I will briefly present the account of levels of mechanisms.  
 
2. Levels of Mechanisms 
In most philosophical theories of levels of organization, the core idea is that levels are 
compositional:  wholes are at a higher level than the parts that they are composed of (e.g., 
Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Wimsatt 1994; Kim 1999). The mechanistic account of levels 
retains this basic idea, with one important amendment: the relata are not just wholes and parts; 
they are behaving mechanisms and their active components. This means that the higher-level 
entity is an active mechanism performing some function, and the lower-level entities are 
components that contribute to the mechanism for this function.  
Craver gives the following characterization: “In levels of mechanisms, the relata are behaving 
mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower levels. These relata are properly 
conceived neither as entities nor as activities; rather, they should be understood as acting 
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entities. The interlevel relationship is as follows: X’s Φ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level 
than Ψ-ing if and only if X’s Φ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s Ψ-ing. Lower-
level components are organized together to form higher-level components” (Craver 2007, 
189). In a similar vein, Bechtel writes: “Within a mechanism, the relevant parts are . . . 
working parts—the parts that perform the operations that enable the mechanism to realize the 
phenomenon of interest. These may be of different sizes, but they are distinguished by the fact 
that they figure in the functioning of the mechanism. It is the set of working parts that are 
organized and whose operations are coordinated to realize the phenomenon of interest that 
constitute a level” (Bechtel 2008, 146). 
Craver’s (2007, 165-170) main example is the case of spatial memory and LTP (Long Term 
Potentiation), where he identifies four levels. On the top of the hierarchy there is the level of 
spatial memory, which involves various types of memory and learning. The level of spatial 
map formation includes the structural and computational properties of various brain regions 
involved in spatial memory, most importantly the hippocampus. The cellular-
electrophysiological level includes neurons that depolarize and fire, synapses that undergo 
LTP, action potentials that propagate, and so on. At the bottom of this hierarchy is the 
molecular level, where we find NMDA and AMPA receptors, Ca2+ and Mg2+ ions, etc. Entities 
at each lower level are components of a higher-level mechanism: the hippocampus is an active 
component of the spatial memory mechanism, synapses are active components of the 
hippocampal mechanism of memory consolidation, and finally, NMDA receptors are active 
components of the synaptic mechanism of LTP.    
Importantly, Craver and Bechtel emphasize that levels of mechanisms are not general levels of 
organization in the vein of Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), Churchland and Sejnowski (1992) 
or Wimsatt (1994). “A consequence of this view is that levels are identified only with respect 
to a given mechanism; this approach does not support a conception of levels that extend across 
the natural world” (Bechtel 2007).”How many levels there are, and which levels are included, 
are questions to be answered on a case-by-case basis by discovering which components at 
which size scales are explanatorily relevant for a given phenomenon” (Craver 2007, 191). 
Craver and Bechtel see this as a point in favor of the mechanistic account of levels, since 
accounts of general levels of organization are ridden with problems: it makes little sense to 
compare the level of glaciers and pyramidal cells, or black holes and microchips. However, 
this also has some radical implications: in the mechanistic framework, it does not make sense 
to ask whether things that belong to different mechanisms are at the same level or not. We 
cannot even say that a certain molecule in a hippocampus is at a lower level than the 
hippocampus, unless the molecule is a component of some hippocampal mechanism (Craver 
2007, 191).  
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Even within one mechanism, not all things are in a level-relation to each other (see, e.g., 
Craver 2007, 193). One salient example of this is that there is no sense in which the 
subcomponents of different components of the mechanism are at the same or different level 
(Bechtel 2008, 147). For example, a component C1 of mechanism M is at one level lower than 
M, and a subcomponent S1 of C1 is one level lower than the component C1. Another 
component C2 of M is also one level lower than the mechanism M, and its subcomponent S2 is 
one level lower than the component C2. However, according to the mechanistic account, the 
question whether subcomponents S1 and S2 are at the same or different level makes no sense, 
since they do not stand in a part-whole relation to each other. I return to this issue in the next 
section. 
To summarize: in levels of mechanisms, the relata are behaving mechanisms at higher levels 
and their components or working parts at lower levels; things that do not stand in part-whole 
(or component-mechanism) relation are not at higher or lower levels with respect to each 
other. Consequently, levels of mechanisms are local – they are indentified with respect to a 
certain phenomenon or function and the mechanism that is responsible for it. In the next 
section, I show that these features lead to problems.  
 
3. Components, Mechanisms, and Problems 
Let us consider the mechanism for phototransduction (the conversion of light signals into 
electrophysiological information) in the retina (see, e.g., Pugh and Lamb 2000). Components 
of this mechanism include rod and cone cells, which are morphologically and functionally 
distinct types of cells. However, the phototransduction cascade in both rods and cones 
involves similar components: G proteins (transducin), cyclic guanosine monophosphate 
(cGMP), cGMP-gated ion channels, and so on. The cGMP-gated channels in rods and the 
same types of channels in cones are subcomponents of different components of the mechanism 
for light transduction. They do not stand in a part-whole relation. Hence, according to the 
mechanistic account, there is no sense in which they are at the same or higher or lower level 
with regard to each other.  
However, this is quite implausible. cGMP-gated ion channels in rods and cGMP-gated ion 
channels in cones are the same types of things with the same properties, at the same scale, in 
the same system, and playing a corresponding role in their respective mechanisms (i.e., they 
are the same types of “acting entities”). If the mechanistic account implies that there is no 
sense in which these ion channels are at the same level, something seems to have gone wrong, 
or at least the levels metaphor is used in a way that is extremely unintuitive (I return to this in 
Section 4). 
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Things get even more problematic when we consider subcomponents that are causally 
interacting with each other. For example, consider synaptic transmission between rod cells and 
(OFF-type) bipolar cells. In the mechanism for synaptic transmission between these cells, 
active components of the rod cell include synaptic vesicles, which in turn have glutamate 
molecules as their subcomponents. The active components of the bipolar cells include 
(AMPA) glutamate receptors, which have “binding sites” as active components. When the rod 
cell is firing, the glutamate molecules in the vesicles are released, and they bind to the binding 
sites of the glutamate receptors.  
This means that subcomponents (glutamate molecules) of one component (synaptic vesicles) 
are causally interacting with subcomponents (binding sites) of a different component (AMPA 
receptors).1 Yet, Craver and Bechtel explicitly state that there is no sense in which 
subcomponents of different components are at the same level. This is not only peculiar, but 
also in fundamental conflict with Craver and Bechtel’s (2007) account of cross-level 
causation: they explicitly defend the view that there is no cross-level or downward causation – 
causation is an intralevel matter, and effects can be then “mechanistically mediated” upwards 
or downwards in the mechanism. In other words, being at the same level is a necessary 
condition for causal interaction. However, we have now seen that if we follow Craver and 
Bechtel’s own theory of levels, there are clear cases where there are causal interactions 
between entities that are not at the same level. Thus, there is a fundamental conflict between 
the mechanistic theory of levels and the mechanistic account of downward causation.2  
These problems are related to the fact that the mechanistic account gives no satisfactory 
criterion for determining when things are at the same level. According to Craver, there is only 
a partial answer to this question: ”X and S are at the same level of mechanisms only if X and S 
are components in the same mechanism, X's Φ-ing is not a component in S's Ψ-ing, and S's Ψ-
ing is not a component in X's Φ-ing.” (2007, 192). In other words, what places two items at 
the same mechanistic level is that they are in the same mechanism, and neither is a component 
of the other (Craver 2007, 195).3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Fazekas	  and	  Kertesz	  (2011)	  point	  out	  other	  examples	  and	  argue	  that,	  quite	  generally,	  if	  the	  components	  of	  a	  mechanism	  causally	  interact,	  also	  their	  subcomponents	  have	  to	  causally	  interact.	  2	  The	  account	  of	  causation	  most	  naturally	  fitting	  the	  general	  framework	  here	  is	  the	  interventionist	  theory	  of	  causation	  (Woodward	  2003),	  which	  also	  Craver	  (2007)	  explicitly	  endorses.	  3	  In	  Bechtel’s	  account,	  things	  are	  at	  the	  same	  level	  if	  they	  are	  working	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  mechanism	  (Bechtel	  2008,	  146-­‐147).	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  same	  problems	  as	  Craver’s	  criterion.	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One way of interpreting this is that if any two components in the mechanism are not in a part-
whole relation with each other, they are at the same level. However, this would have some 
bizarre consequences. Consider components C1 and C2 in mechanism M. They are at the same 
level, since C1 is not a component of C2 and C2 is not a component of C1. Consider then a 
subcomponent S1 of C1. It is also not a component of C2, and C2 is not a component of S1. 
Then C2 and S1 are also at the same level, as well as all the further subcomponents of S1 and 
all their subcomponents! This would be a rather strange account of the same-level relation.  
The idea must rather be that things that are components of a mechanism but not components of 
any intermediate component are at the same level. For example, rod A is at the same level as 
rod B, since they are components of the phototransduction mechanism and do not stand in a 
part-whole relation to each other, but a cGMP-gated ion channel in rod B is not at the same 
level as rod A, because the cGMP-gated ion channel is a component of rod B, and not a 
“direct” component of the phototransduction mechanism. Let us call such components that are 
components of the mechanism directly and not in virtue of being components of another 
component direct components.  
If no further restrictions are added, direct components can include things of radically different 
sizes with very different causal properties. For example, direct components in the mechanism 
for light transduction in rod cells include things such as the outer segment of the cell, which 
has the function of capturing photons and may contain billions of opsin molecules. On the 
other hand, direct components in the mechanism also include single photons hitting the cell, or 
Na+-ions in the cell - these are also not components in any intermediate component of the 
mechanism. It follows that rod outer segments are at the same level of mechanism as photons 
or Na+-ions, even though they differ in scale with a factor of at least 107.  
Thus, it seems that the same-level criterion that Craver proposes is both too weak and too 
strong.4 It is too weak because it implies that in many cases things that are causally interacting 
or are the same types of things in the same system are not at the same level. It is too strong 
because it implies that in many cases things that are of radically different size and that interact 
at completely different force or time scales are at the same level. This (1) makes the criterion 
ineffective for distinguishing between interlevel and intralevel causation, and (2) stretches the 
level-metaphor near the breaking point. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  personal	  communication,	  Craver	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  he	  no	  longer	  believes	  that	  we	  need	  a	  criterion	  for	  being	  at	  the	  same	  level	  –	  what	  is	  important	  is	  determining	  when	  things	  are	  at	  different	  levels.	  However,	  I	  doubt	  whether	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  talk	  of	  levels	  if	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  things	  can	  be	  at	  the	  same	  level.	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4. Levels: A Deflationary Account 
The main source for the problems outlined above is that the account of Craver and Bechtel is 
too limited as a theory of levels. It is not an undue exaggeration to say that the account of 
levels of mechanisms is in fact an account of mechanistic composition: it relies entirely on the 
component-mechanism relation and simply labels whole mechanisms as being at higher 
“levels” and their components as being at lower “levels”. For this reason, it is difficult to 
define any reasonable same-level relation in this framework: composition only relates parts 
and wholes, and not parts with other parts or wholes with other wholes.  
My suggestion is, first of all, to take the approach of Craver and Bechtel to its logical 
conclusion and to deflate the notion of mechanistic levels into simply mechanistic 
composition. We can simply reinterpret the mechanistic account of levels as an account of 
mechanistic composition, as long as we strip away the idea of being at the “same” mechanistic 
level and the related claims about same-level causation. I fully agree with Craver and Bechtel 
in that explanations in neuroscience refer to robust properties and generalizations throughout 
the compositional hierarchy – for example, in the explanation for phototransduction we need 
to consider the 11-cis-retinal molecule changing shape, the rod photoreceptor cell 
hyperpolarizing, the retinal network computing, the eye converting light to 
electrophysiological signals, and so on.  
However, it is obvious from section 3 that this will not be sufficient as a framework for 
dealing with issues such as downward causation. Therefore, the second step of my solution is 
to take into account the dimension of scale, which is largely independent from composition. In 
their discussions of levels, Craver (2007, ch. 5) and Bechtel (2008, 143-145) acknowledge the 
importance of size scale, but argue that it is secondary to composition: components cannot be 
larger that the wholes they are part of, so in this sense the size dimension partly follows the 
compositional dimension. However, we have also seen above that composition and size often 
come apart: the direct components of a mechanism can be of radically different sizes, and 
similarity or difference of size does not imply that entities are in any way compositionally 
related. Composition and scale are largely independent dimensions. 
The most commonly discussed scale is size scale, but also other scales such as the temporal 
scale (the speed of interactions) or the force scale (the strength of interactions) may be just as 
important in understanding complex systems (see, e.g., Simon 1962; Rueger and McGivern 
2010). For example, molecular interactions happen at a much faster time scale as interactions 
between neurons, which are again faster than interactions between brain areas. The force scale 
is particularly important when considering physical and chemical interactions: for example, 
the forces binding subatomic particles (quarks) together are much stronger than the forces 
binding atoms together, which are again stronger than the forces binding molecules together. 
For the sake of clarity, I focus here mostly on the size scale. 
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One problem of the mechanistic account of levels that I discussed above is that its same-level 
relation leads to results that seem arbitrary and unintuitive: for example, there is no sense in 
which subcomponents of components are at the same mechanistic level, even when they are 
the same types of things, while entities of radically different sizes can be at the same level. In 
my view, it is better to get rid of the idea of being at the “same level” altogether, and just to 
focus on how things are related on different scales (see also Potochnik and McGill 2012). For 
example, cGMP-gated ion channels in rods are obviously found at the same size (and 
temporal) scale than cGMP-gated ion channels in cones, while rod outer segments are found at 
very different size (and temporal) scales than Na+ ions.  
One outcome of analyzing levels in terms of scale and composition is that we no longer need 
any distinct notion of level, at least not in any sense resembling levels of mechanisms. If scale 
and composition are sufficient for analyzing explanations in neuroscience, the notion of 
“level” does not add anything to our conceptual toolkit. Explanations in neuroscience are 
“multilevel” only in the sense that they refer to robust properties and generalizations at various 
stages in the compositional hierarchy and at different (size) scales.  
This approach is also supported by neuroscientific practice. In contrast to what Craver (2007, 
ch. 5) suggests, levels talk is not ubiquitous in neuroscience, neither in journal articles nor in 
standard textbooks (e.g., Kandel, Jessell and Schwartz 2000; Purves et al. 2004). This applies 
also to the case of memory consolidation and LTP, which is Craver’s paradigmatic example of 
a multilevel mechanism – see, e.g., McGaugh (2000) and Malenka and Bear (2004) for two 
representative review articles, where there is no mention of levels. When it does appear, the 
term is most often referring to levels of processing, such as the different stages of visual 
information processing (the retina, the LGN, the visual cortex, and so on), which are 
something very different from levels of mechanisms, and levels only in a metaphorical sense.5 
This supports my point that the notion of level, at least in the sense of levels of mechanisms, 
does not pick up anything distinct or explanatorily substantial.6 
If one prefers using the term “level” to refer to compositional hierarchies or to different size 
scales (or to various other things – scale and composition are merely the senses most relevant 
in this context), one has to at least make clear in exactly which sense the term is used. 
However, the danger in this is that other intuitions about levels may creep in – for example, 
when talking of compositional hierarchies in terms of levels, one is easily lead to think that 
things can be at the “same level” of composition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Craver	  (2007,	  ch.	  5)	  offers	  a	  useful	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  the	  term	  “level”	  is	  used	  in	  neuroscience.	  	  6	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  (2007,	  54)	  reach	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  physics.	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5. Downward Causation and Levels 
 I have argued above that the idea of levels of mechanisms is thoroughly problematic, and that 
we should abandon the project of trying to define levels. Let us now turn to the issue of 
downward or top-down causation that has been traditionally discussed in the framework of 
levels (e.g., Campbell 1974; Emmeche et al. 2000; Kim 1992, 1999; Craver and Bechtel 2007; 
Kistler 2009). The question is whether higher-level causes can have lower-level effects. In 
spite of various arguments to the effect that downward causation is not possible, the debate 
keeps resurfacing, partly because (neuro)scientists often rely on top-down experiments and 
explanations that seem to imply some kind of downward causation.  
As we have seen above, Craver and Bechtel (2007) have proposed a novel solution to the 
problem of downward causation. They argue that what appears to be downward causation in 
top-down experiments and elsewhere should be understood as normal same-level causation 
that has “mechanistically mediated” effects downwards in the mechanism: there is no 
causation from higher to lower levels or the other way around.  
Considering the discussion in the previous two sections, it is clear that the reason why the 
solution of Craver and Bechtel is problematic is that it relies on the distinction between same-
level and cross-level causation. We have seen how difficult it is to define the same-level 
relation, or levels in general, in a coherent and scientifically plausible way. For this reason, 
basing the account of downward causation on the distinction between same-level causation 
(which is supposed to be unproblematic) and cross-level causation (which is supposed to be 
unacceptable) necessarily leads to problems.  
One possibility would be to try to reformulate Craver and Bechtel’s solution in terms of scale 
and composition. If we could distinguish between same- and different-“level” causation in 
terms of scale and composition, perhaps the solution could still work. Unfortunately, this does 
not seem to be the case. As I have already pointed out in the previous section, composition as 
such does not involve any same-“level” relation. Regarding (size) scale, the problem is that 
there is absolutely no reason to restrict causation to things of same or similar size: elephants 
squash flies, the fission of uranium atoms causes cities to disintegrate, and so on (Craver 
(2007, ch. 5) and Bechtel (2008, 144) agree on this). Therefore, we have to conclude that 
Craver and Bechtel’s approach downward causation is unsatisfactory. 
If we abandon the framework of levels and focus on scale and composition, what appears to be 
downward causation reduces to two categories: (1) Causes that act from the mechanism as a 
whole to the components of the same mechanism, and (2) causation between entities of 
different (size) scales. In my view, it is fairly clear that there can be no causation between 
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things that are related by composition (category (1)), since composition is a form of non-
causal dependency. It does not seem right to say that, e.g., the retina as a whole causes a rod 
cell in that retina to fire. On the other hand, as the examples in the previous paragraph show, 
causation between things of different size is in principle unproblematic (category (2)). In this 
way, putative cases of top-down or downward causation can be analyzed away in terms of 
composition and scale.7 
One remaining problem for “downward” causation of category (2) is Kim’s argument against 
higher-level causes. It might prima facie seem that getting rid of levels dissolves this problem, 
since it is often formulated in terms of levels: the argument states that a higher-level property 
cannot be a genuine cause for a lower-level property, since (due to physical causal closure) the 
lower-level property already has a sufficient lower-level cause (see, e.g., Kim 1992; 1999). 
However, the idea of levels is not essential in Kim’s argument: what is at issue there is the 
tension created by two competing (and non-causally related) causes for the same effect. 
Without the framework of levels, the argument does not disappear, but turns into the general 
causal exclusion argument (see, e.g., Kim (2002) or Bennett (2008) for more).  
What Craver and Bechtel (2007) are considering, and what I have discussed in this section, is 
the intelligibility of causes acting from higher to lower levels. I have argued that downward 
causation is not intelligible in the sense of causation from a mechanism as a whole to the parts 
of that same mechanism, but causation from higher to lower scales is as such unproblematic. 
There may be real problems related to causation in neuroscience, such as the causal exclusion 
problem, but there is no distinct problem of downward causation. 
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